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THE CRIMINAL LAW PRACTITIONER'S DILEMMA: WHAT SHOULD THE
LAWYER DO WHEN HIS CLIENT INTENDS TO TESTIFY FALSELY?*
KENNETH REICHSTEINt
The lawyer, specifically the criminal law practi-
tibner, is faced with many role dilemmas1 created
by the conflicting normative commands of his
profession. Where the client has confessed to his
attorney, yet intends to take the stand to deny
his guilt,2 the attorney's dual roles as the advocate
of his client's position in an adversary system of
justice and as an officer of the court come into
conflict. This study examines the diverse resolu-
tions of this role conflict, suggested by various
members of the legal community. In addition, it
discusses the reaction to the dilemma by a seledted
geographic segment of the profession.
The current controversy3 was initiated by Mon-
* The author wishes to acknowledge the support of
the National Institute of Mental Health and the Na-
tional Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion, which made this study possible. Its support;
however, does not necessarily indicate concurrence in
the statements or conclusions contained herein.
tAssistant Professor of Sociology, Temple Uni-
versity.
I Parsons, A Sociologist Views the Legal Profession,
in CoNrEREncE oN =x PR01ossIoN OF LAW AND
LEGAL EDUCATION 49 (1962).
2 The reasoning of this paper is also helpful in deal-
ing with situations where the client tells the attorney
he intends to perjure himself in other ways than by
admitting guilt.
8 For many years the Bar has been divided on this
problem. One wing believes that their first loyalty is to
the client. Perhaps their best known spokesman is
Charles P. Curtis. He wrote:
[The lawyer's] loyalty runs to his client. He has no
other master. Not the court? you ask.... No, in a
paradoxical way. The lawyer's official duty, re-
quired of him indeed by the court, is to devote him-
self to the client. The court comes second by
court's, that is, the law's, own commandment.
Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAx. L. Rv. 3
(1951).
Members of the other wing consider themselves
primarily officers of the court and favor strict con-
struction of the Canons of Ethics. This view is ex-
pressed by Lloyd P. Stryker:
The standards of conduct the lawyers must obey
are as high, and are as generally followed, as the
roe H. Freedman4 in a paper presented to the
Criminal Trial Institute of the District of Columbia
Bar Association.' Professor Freedman argued that
a lawyer is obligated to exploit every means to
secure his client's acquittal and that a declaration
by the defendant that he would perjure himself
should not alter that obligation.6 Freedman posited
that the contrary position would raise constitu-
tional problems7 and would be inconsistent with
certain policies underlying our legal system, namely
the
maintenance of the adversary system, the
presumption of innocence, the prosecution's
burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, the right to counsel and the obligation
of confidentiality between the lawyer and
client8
Considering the lawyer's role as an officer of the
court within the'scope of the adversary proceeding,
most exalted rules that govern any men on earth.
.All advocates are bound by these siandards, and
they must obey them. They may and should fight
hard for their clients, but they must fight fairly.
They may and should say all that honestly and
honorably can be said for them. They may say it
with fervor and all the persuasion in their power;
but in saying it they may not deceive, they must
not lie.
STR=YXR, Tus ART O ADvocACY, 283 (1954).
4 Professor of Law, George Washington University;
Co-Director, Criminal Trial Institute, Washington,
D.C.5 Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Crim-
inal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64
MhcE. L. Rav. 1469 (1966).6 Id. at 1482.7 Id. at 1477:
, [The] client in such a case might well have
grounds for appeal on the basis of deprivation of
due process and denial of the right of counsel, since
he will have been tried before, and sentenced by, a
judge who has been informed of his.. . guilt by
his own attorney.
8 Id at 1482.
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Freedman said withdrawal from the case or in-
forming the court of the defendant's intended
perjury would only shift the ethical burden to
another lawyer or to the judge.9
Therefore, the obligation of confidentiality, in
the context of our adversary system, appar-
ently allows the attorney no alternative to
putting the perjurious witness on the stand
without explicit or implicit disclosure of the
attorney's knowledge to either the judge or
the jury'
Such an analysis places the interests of the client
above the attorney's obligations as an officer of
the court." In Freedman's conception of the func-
tion of a defense attorney, the client is truly
treated as being innocent until the court finds him
guilty, even when the client has admitted his guilt
to his lawyer. 2
Freedman's paper stimulated a series of rebuttals
to his conception. 1 The most vehement of these, 4
by Mr. Chief Justice Warren Burger, who was then
a judge on the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, urged a position that was dianietrically
opposed to Freedman's. Chief Justice Burger
stated that
Canon 15 and Canon 37 of the American Bar
Association are explicit and clear and it is
sheer nonsense for anyone to claim that they
leave doubt about the tendering of perjured
testimony."
' If the original attorney withdraws, the client will
seek new counsel who will be faced with either the
same dilemma or the prospect of a client who with-
holds relevant information. Id. at 1475-76.
"0 Id. at 1477-78.
11 This is consistent with the views of Curtis. See
note 3 supra.
2 Freedman, supra note 5, at 1471.11 The author was also subjected to personal attack
for his stand. Several judges complained to the Com-
mittee on Admissions and Grievances of the District
Court of the District of Columbia, urging disciplinary
action to be taken against Freedman. The furor re-
silted in a hearing, two meetings, a de novo review by
eleven district court judges and a decision by the Com-
mittee to "proceed no further in the matter." Id. at 1469
n.1.
' Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and
Defense Personnel: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 Am. Cums.
L.Q. 11 (1966).
15ABA CANONS OF PRORESSIONAL ETHics No. 15
(in part):
But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the
great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within
and not without the bounds of the law. The office
of attorney does not permit, much less does it
demand of him for any client, violation of law or
The Chief Justice did not shield his revulsion at
the suggestion that an attorney should knowingly
permit his client to perjure himself:
[t]he proposition that perjury may be ever
knowingly used is as pernicious as the idea
that counterfeit documents can be fabricated
and knowingly offered to the court as genuine.
This is so utterly absurd that one wonders
why the subject need even be discussed among
persons trained in the law.'0
Chief Justice Burger articulated his conviction
that the lawyer's duty to his client would never
conflict with his duties to the court if these duties
were properly understood The duty to the client
must always be subservient to the attorney's
primary obligations as an officer of the court.i
Freedman, in contrast, reversed the priority of
loyalties, placing the welfare of the client ahead of
the court. 9
It is possible, however, for the practicing at-
torney to avoid confronting this issue by resort to
the epistemological argument that the attorney
does not really "know" that his client will commit
perjury.
[C]ounsel is not justified in introducing any
evidence which he knows to be false.... But it
frequently happens that testimony is offered
which the counsel may suspect to be untrue
but which he does not know to be false. In such
event it is his duty... to present this testi-
mony and leave it to the jury to determine its
any manner of fraud or chicane. He must obey his
conscience and not that of his client.
ABA CANONS oF PRorEssIoNAL ETHics No. 37 states
(in part):
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's
confidences.... The announced intention of a
client to commit a crime is not included within
the confidences which he is bound to respect. He
may properly make such disclosures as may be
necessary to prevent the act or to protect those
against whom it is threatened.
Note that Canon 37 does not require the attorney to
notify the court or law enforcement officials of his
client's intent.
16 Burger, supra note 14, at 12.
17 Burger, supra note 14, at 16:
The noble aspects of our conception of criminal
justice can be maintained without having every
defense counsel envisage himself as a white knight
in shining armor out to slay the fascist-minded
prosecutors and their witnesses.
"8 This is in conformity with the views of Stryker.
See supra note 3.
is See, p. 1 supra.
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truth or falsity. The counsel has no right as
such to pass upon the veracity of witnesses.20
In the situation under study, the defendant has
told his lawyer that he has committed the act. But
the lawyer does not "know" that his client has
committed the act in the same sense that he would
"know" if he had seen his client do it. The client
may be mistaken, or he may be shielding someone.
Freedman was unwilling to avoid the issue by
reference to the epistemological argument. He
relied on Canon 37, as Mr. Chief justice Burger
had, and on Opinion 287 interpreting that canon:
[w]here the court is about to impose a sentence
*based on the misinformation that the defend-
ant has no previous criminal record, if the
attorney for the defendant learns of the previ-
ous record through his client's communica-
tion, he has no duty to correct the misinforma-
tion.n
Freedman argued from this that an attorney is not
required to divulge his client's intention to perjure
himself.n
He also realized that part of Canon:37 provides a
basis for reaching the contrary conclusion:
[t]he announced intention of a client to co nmit
a crime is not included within the confidences
which he is bound to respect. He may properly
make such disclosures as may be necessary to
20 But see, Battle, The Defense of a Client Whose
Guilt is Known, 4 N. Y. L. R.v. 74, 75 (1926).2 ABA Comm . ON PROFEssIONAL ErHics, OPINIONs,
No. 287 (1957). In this opinion, the Committee also
held that Opinion 29 takes precedence over Opinions
155 and 156. Whereas Opinion 155 states that an
attorney has a duty to disclose the whereabouts of a
client who has jumped bail and Opinion 156 states an
attorney is obligated to disclose a client's violation of
probation condition, Opinion 29 states that an attorney
should not reveal the confidences of a fugitive client
who has forfeited bail.
In 1959 the Professional Ethics Committee held that
the attorney for a defendant accused of armed robbery
may not volunteer to the authorities information ob-
tained from his client as to the whereabouts of the
stolen goods, even though the stolen items consisted
of approximately twenty handguns which may be on
the verge of falling into the hands of persons who will
use them for criminal purposes. But subsequent to the
trial, according to the Committee, the attorney should
advise his client to notify the authorities of the loca-
tion of the guns, failing which the attorney should
withdraw from further represdntation of the client.
Unpublished opinion of the Chicago Bar Association
(May, 1959).
See p. 2 supra. Freedman's use of Opinion 287
to substantiate his position is not, however, highly
persuasive. The situation with whichthat opinion is
concerned does not involve the guilt br innocence of
the defendant.
prevent the act or protect those against whom
it is threatened.P
Thus, since perjury is a crime, it can be argued
that Canon 37 does not bar disclosure of intended
perjury. But Freedman contends that the crime
of perjury within the case in which the lawyer is
serving cannot logically be an exception to the
obligation of confidentiality.2 In addition, the
provision "does not require disclosure but only
permits it." 25
Canon 15 also can be read to require disclosure
of perjury. This canon states in part that
it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the
great trust of the lawyer is to be performed
within and not without the bounds of the law.
The office of attorney does not permit, much
less does it demand of him for any client, viola-
tion of law or any manner or fraud or chicane.
He must obey his own conscience and not
that of his client.
2 6
Freedman, however, maintains that Canon 15 is
not applicable to the attorney who has made every
effort to dissuade his client from testifying per-
juriously.n Unwillingly putting the perjuring wit-
ness on the stand is not proscribed by Canon 15.2
Finally, Canon 29 requires, inter alia, that coun-
sel in a trial in which perjury has been committed
inform the prosecuting authorities of the perjury.29
Freedman construes this as only applying to wit-
nesses of the opposing party.Y' Any other construc-
tion requiring disclosure of one's own client's
perjury would violate the dictates of Canon 37.8 °
Other commentators have asserted that the
Cianons simply do not answer this question. James
E. Starrs,"2 recognizing the impotence of the
2 ABA CANONS OF PROrEssioNAL E mcs No. 37.
21 Freedman, supra note 5, at 1478.
25 Id.26 ABA CANNONS OF PROrEssIONAL ETmcs No. 15.
27 Freedman, supra note 5, at 1478.
Is See also ABA CANNONS OF PROFEssIONAL ETmcs
41 which reqiires in part that
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or decep-
tion has been practiced, which has unjustly im-
posed upon the court or a party, he should en-
deavor to rectify it; at first by advising his client,
and if his client refuses to forego the advantage
thus unjustly gained, he should promptly inform
the injured person or his counsel, so that they may
take appropriate steps.
29 1d.'29.
20 Freedman, supra note 5, at 1478.
31Id.2Professor of Law, George Washington University
Law School.
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Canons,33 has sought to resolve the dilemma by
reference to his conception of the objectives of the
criminal legal system!4 He conceived the criminal
trial not as a search for the truth, 5 but rather as the
occasion for the prosecution to prove the defend-
ant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.3 6 This view
leads to the conclusion that the confession of guilt
by a client to his attorney should not-affect the
attorney in any manner because the adversary
system considers this confession irrelevant to the
court's adjudication of guilt or innocence."
In a similar vein, Addison Bowman s has argued
that the Canons39 are inapplicable except as a
general guide.4" He stated that
the Canons of Ethics are so vague, so ambigu-
ous, and so contradictory that they are of
little or no help in resolving these problems,
and that almost any position, on a given issue,
can reasonably be defended with support from
the Canons.'
While admitting that withdrawal from the case
prior to trial would be an acceptable solution for
the individual attorney," Bowman emphasized
"IStarrs referred to the Canons as "glittering gen-
eralities which.., lack 'a body to kick and a soul to
condemn."' Starrs, Professional Responsibility: Three
Basic Propositions 5 Am. CRsn L.Q. 17, 20 (1966).
4 Starrs, Professional Responsibility: Three Basic
Propositions, 5 Am. Cmdr. L.Q. 17 (1966).
3" See Kent, Legal Ethics, 6 Mica. L. REv. 468, 474
(1908).
The chief business of the lawyer is that of counsel
as to legal rights, and the maintenance, through
the courts, of such rights. The lawyer offers him-
self as an expert as to the legal rights of all who
ask his assistance and as to their enforcement. He
is not an expert as to moral as distinguished from
legal rights. He may know less of these than his
client. There is, too, such a difference of opinion
as to mere moral rights that, generally,-they do
not constitute a basis for advice.
31 Starrs, supra note 28, at 21.
7WhSTON, LIFE AND LAw 272 (1940).
The lawyer must decide when he takes a case
whether it is a suitable one for him to undertake,
and after this decision is made, he is not justified
in turning against his client by exposing injurious
evidence entrusted to him.
13 Deputy Director of the Legal Aid Agency for the
District of Columbia.
11 ABA CANONS Or PROFEssIoNAL ETHics Nos. 5,
15, 29, 37, and 41.
10 Bowman, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and
Defense Personnel: An Attorney's Viewpoint, 5 AM.
CRi. L.Q. 28, 28-29 (1966).
41 Id. at 28.
42 Withdrawal merely shifts the problem to another
lawyer and leaves open the possibility that the de-
fendant will perjure himself the next time without
informing his counsel. Compare note 7 and note 9
supra.
that upon a court's refusal to grant such a request,
the attorney should not present the defendant's
testimony in a fashion that may lead the jury to
conclude that counsel did not believe his client.4
Because of their diverse approaches, these com-
mentators have widely differing practical reactions.
All agree that the attorney should attempt to
dissuade his client from perjuring himself.4 The
divergence of opinion commences if this course of
action fails to change the client's mind. Although
Chief Justice Burger does not explicitly state that
the lawyer must inform the court of the intended
perjury, he does place severe restrictions on the
attorney's subsequent conduct. The lawyer may
not "facilitate the perjury in any substantial
degree." 45 In explanation of this admonition he
states:
If in those circumstances the lawyer's imme-
diate withdrawal from the case is either not
feasible, or if the judge refuses to permit with-
drawal, the lawyer's course is dear: He may not
engage in direct examination of his client to
facilitate the known perjury. He should confine
himself to asking the witness to identify him-
self and to make a statement, but he cannot
participate in the fraud by conventional direct
examination.
46
Chief Justice Burger also says, however, that the
defense attorney must not suggest "in argument
to the jury that the perjured testimony of his
client is not the truth .... " 4
David Bress concurs with the Chief Justice's
The motion to withdraw may be unethical in this
situation, leaving the attorney in a situation where,
according to the often repeated proverb, "he is damned
if he does and damned if he doesn't." Canon 44 pro-
vides that if the client,
insists upon an unjust or immoral course in the
conduct of his case, or if he persists over the at-
torney's remonstrance in presenting of frivilous
defenses.. . the lawyer may be warranted in with-
drawing on due notice to the client allowing him
time to employ another lawyer. (underscoring
added).
While this Canon seems to conform to the dictate
that the attorney should not be a party to his client's
future crimes, set forth in Canon 37, the requirement
of due notice creates a problem. Can due notice be
properly given once the trial has begun without injuring
the rights of the defendant? See note 7 supra.
4Bowman, supra note 40, at 30.
4Freedman supra note 4, at 1477. See also Bress,
Standards of Conduct of the Prosecution and Defense
Function, 5 Am. Cmn. L.Q. 23, 24 (1966).
45 Burger, supra note 14, at 14.46 Id. at 13.
47 Id. at 14.
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position on the behavior of the attorney confronted
with this problem. Bress states that the attorney
should move to withdraw from the case with-
out revealing any confidences received from
the client. If withdrawal is not permitted, then
the defense counsel should limit his examina-
tion of the defendant who will give the per-
jured testimony to the simple question: "You
have a statement to make to the court and
jury-will you now make it." And he should
not argue the truth of that statement in his
argument to the jury, because to do so would
be a fraud upon the court. He may, neverthe-
less, argue the case on the sufficiency of the
government's testimony and the other evi-
dence offered by the defense, exclusive of the
defendant's own perjured testimony.4
Bowman would attempt to withdraw from the
case first after being informed, of his client's in-
tended perjury and then immediately before trial.4 9
If withdrawal attempts fail, Bowman states that
the attorney should proceed with the defense of
his client avoiding any conduct that might jeopard-
ize the defendant's chances. 5
Freedman, as noted, would attempt dissuasion.
However, he considers withdrawal from the case
as an improper course in that it only serves to shift
the ethical problem to the judge or to another
attorney.5 The obligation of the attorney in the
context of the adversary system is to allow the
client to take the stand "without implicit or ex-
plicit disclosure of [his] knowledge to either the
judge or the jury." 52
In an attempt to deal with this problem many
jurisdictions have adopted statutes, requiring the
attorney to be truthful in his contacts with the
court. Some of these laws proscribe deceit or
fraud,0 while others oblige attorneys to use truth-
' Bress, suprra note 44 at 24. See also, Bress, Pro-
fessional Ethics in Criminal Trials: A View of Defense
Counsels' Responsiility, 64 MIcH. L. R v. 1493 (1966).
49 Bowman, supra note 40, at 22.
&0 Id. at 32.
31 Freedman, supra note 5, at 1476.
' Id. at 1477-78.
3ALAS. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 35-2-71 (11) (1949);
D.C. CODE § 11-1302 (1951); IowA CODE § 610.15
(1946); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-106 (1963); NEB.
R1v. STAT. ch. 7-106 (1962); N.'M. STAT. ANN. ch.
18-1-16 (1941); N.D. Rxv. CODE tit. 27, § 13-08 (1)
(1960); UTAH CODE Am. tit. 78, § 3-31 (1943).
Most of these laws are worded very generally. For
example, California deems it to be the duty of an
attorney
to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him such means as consistent
ful means in advocating their client's causes.4
In Federal practice, the United States Code makes
knowing submission of perjured testimony a
crime.55 Absent a statute, the common law gener-
ally forbids knowing submission of false testimony
by an attorney." However, because these statutes
and cases contain only very general rules, they,
like the Canons, do not specifically deal with the
perjury problem and offer no solution.
Although the issue has been primarily the con-
cern of the legal community, the courts have oc-
casionally been compelled to deal with it where an
attorney has challenged his disbarment. In civil
cases the knowing profference of perjured testi-
mony is usually considered anathema to the
judicial process.5 However in the context of the
criminal trial the courts have been reluctant to
define the bounds of the attorney-client privilege.
In In Re RyderN an attorney concealed stolen
money and a shotgun given to him by a client
about to be arrested for bank robbery. It was
with truth, and never to seek to mislead the judges
or any judicial officer by an artifice or false state-
ment of fact or law.
CAL. Busmss AND PoR. CODE, § 6068(a) (1954).
The ambiguity of such a broad prohibition is in-
creased when the attorney is not positive his client is
truthful in his admission of guilt. These statutes, like
the canons, are not specific enough to deal with this
problem and therefore are not conclusive of the issue.
54ALA. CODE Rxcomp. tit. 46, § 50 (1958); ALAS.
ComrT. LAW ANN. § 32-103 (1939); CAL. Bus. AND
PROF. CODE § 6068(d) (1962); Mnn. STAT. ANN.
§ 48J.06(4) (West, 1958); MIss. CODE ANN.'§ 8665(3)
(1942); N. MEx. STAT. ANN. ch. 18, § 1-9(4) (1954);
N.D. REv. CODE ch. 27, § 13-01(3) (1959); Ox.A.
STAT. Az. tit. 5, § 3(3) (1966); ORE. Con,. LAWS
Aix. § 15-101 (1940); Wis. STAT. tit. 24, § 256.29(1)
(1959).
* See supra note 40. The vague admonitions of these
statutes relate only to clear deceit upon the court and
not to the closer issue presented by the perjury prob-
lem.
55 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
51 Matter of Stein, 1 N.J. 228, 62 A.2d, 801 (1949);
In re Spicu, 126 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1942); People ex
rel. Colorado Bar Assoc. v. McCanfi, 80 Colo. 220,
249 P. 1093 (1926); In re O'Keefe, 55 Mont. 200, 175
P. 593 (1918); Townsend v. State Bar of Cal., 32 Cal.
2d 592, 197 P.2d 326 (1948); Kingsland v. Dorsey,
338 U. S. 318 (1949); In re Cox, 164 Kan. 160, 188
P.2d 652 (1948); In re Obartuch, 386 Ill. 323, 54 N.E.2d
470 (1944). But cf. Matter of Gral, 282 N.Y. 428, 26
N.E.2d 963 (1940); Matter of Ellis, 282 N.Y. 435, 26
N.E.2d 967 (1940).
5In re Mendelson, 135 N.Y.S. 438 (1912), an at-
torney was disbarred for allowing clients and witnesses
to testify falsely as to insurance claims; In re Davidson,
223 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1962), held an attorney who allowed
a couple to falsely testify they were South Carolina
residents, for the purpose of obtaining a divorce in
that state, should be disbarred.
58 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967).
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Ryder's contention that this act was within the
scope of confidential communication. The court
held that the function of a defense attorney is not
to act in the best interest of his client where such
interests bear no "reasonable relation to the privi-
lege .... " "Ryder," said the court, "made him-
self an active participant in a criminal act, ostensi-
bly wearing the mantle of a loyal advocate, but in
reality serving as accessory after the fact." 51 The
Ryder case, though clearly distinguishable from
the problem under scrutiny here, helps to delineate
the parameters of the attorney-client privilege.
In Matter of Hardenbrook0 an attorney was dis-
barred for permitting a criminal trial to continue
to a verdict after he knew his client had given
perjured testimony." Conversely in Johns v.
Smyth2 the defense attorney refused to put his
client on the witness stand, submit instructions to
the jury,6 or give dosing argument because he
had some doubt as to the veracity of his client's
statements and his innocence. The court, in re-
versing the conviction, stated that
[w]hen the defendant was interviewed by his
court appointed attorney, the attorney stated
that he had reason to doubt the accuracy of
the defendant's statement. It was at this time
that the attorney's conscience actuated his
future conduct ....
The opinion65 was based on the court's strong
feeling that an attorney can not be deterred from
effectively representing a client by his personal
opinion as to the client's guilt. 6
The notion that an attorney does not have the
right to prejudge his client7 forms part of the
11 Id. at 714.
10 135 App. Div. 634, 121 N.Y.S. 250 (1909).
61 This case rests on the tenuous assumption, by the
court, that the attorney should believe his client when
told that he would perjure himself.
62 176 F. Supp 949 (E.D. Va. 1949).
1 If the attorney had believed his client or had acted
in that manner, he would have submitted a jury in-
struction that if the jury believed the defendant they
could -find him guilty of the lesser charge of man-
slaughter. Id. at 952.
" Id. at 953.65 Id. at 954.
66 The court in this case was motivated by the dic-
tates of the Canons of Professional Ethics. It referred
to Canon 5 in support of its holding. That Canon states,
in part: "It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the
defense of a person accused of a crime, regardless of
his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused...
Id. at 952.
67 Freedman, supra note 5, at 1471 (emphasis added):
The adversary system has further ramifications in
a criminal case. The defendant is presumed to be
basis for Freedman's position. 63 It is his contention
that an accused may confess for many reasons
other than guilt.69 Thus, to deny a client full repre-
sentation before the court adjudicates his guilt or
innocence would, in Freedman's view, be antago-
nistic to the legal process. 0
[It will be a dark day in the history of our
judicial system if a conviction is permitted
to stand where an attorney furnished to an
indigent defendant candidly admits his con-
innocent. The burden is on the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant is guilty. The plea of not guilty does not
necessarily mean "not guilty in fact," for the de-
fendant may mean "not legally guilty." Even the
accused who knows that he committed the crime is
entitled to put the government to its proof. Indeed,
the accused who knows that he is guilty has an
absolute constitutional right to remain silent.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485, 491 (1964).
The moralist might quite reasonably understand
this to mean that, under these circumstances, the
defendant and his lawyer are privileged to lie to
the court in pleading not guilty. In my judgment
the moralist is right. However, our adversary sys-
tem and related notions of the proper administration
of criminal justice sanction the lie.
6s Freedman, supra note 5, at 1471.
69 Id. at 1472.
70 See supra note 7.
Recent Supreme Court decisions, assuring .the rights
of the defendant, may ultimately lead to resolution of
the issue in favor of the defendant. Though Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), concern the right of the
defendant not to testify, they are analogous to this
situation where the right to testify is at issue. These
cases restrain the prosecution in its efforts to obtain a
confession from the defendant. The Court has re-
versed other cases where the prosecution has know-
ingly allowed perjured testimony to be given by its
witnesses. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957), Napue
v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). This is considered a
violation of due process. Alcorta v. Tex., supra at 31.
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) held the
constitutional requirement of due process was not
satisfied where the prosecution knew testimony was
false.
While these cases limit the prosecution's efforts, the
Court has not explicitly made the prohibition against
the knowing admission of perjured testimony applicable
to the defense. But John Noonan contends:
If the government prosecutor cannot present a
doubtful witness without calling the defendant's
- attention to his lack of credibility, the defendant
may be asked to observe the same standard.
Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of
Confidentiality 64, Mrcr. L. Rnv. 1485, 1490-91 (1966).
In re Sawyer's Petition, 229 F.2d 805 (1956), held
that the intention to commit perjury destroyed the
attorney client privilege. But see, note 7 supra.
Chief Justice Burger is also in accord with Noonan.
Burger, supra note 14.
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science prevented him from effectively repre-
senting his client.. .. 7
After examination of the writings of legal
scholars, the Canons of Ethics, the statutes, and
the case law the defense attorney would still be un-
able to discern, clearly, his proper response when
confronted with a client who informs him of an in-
tent to commit perjury in his own defense. It is
this ambivalence on this issue that has prompted
the following study.
The purpose of the study is to determine the
views of practitioners, in the belief that the opin-
ions of the practicing bar are relevant to the formu-
lation of the ethical standards those attorneys are
obliged to follow.
THE STUDY
The information for the study came from two
separate groups. The first contained a cross-section
sampling of one hundred and one (101) attorneys
drawn from the total attornei population of the
city of Chicago2 This group will be referred to as
the Random Sample. The second group consisted
of twenty-four (24) attorneys on the *Committee of
Professional Ethics of the Chicago Bar Association,
herein referred to as the Ethics Group7
The Random Sample was composed of two sub-
71' Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949, 954 (E.D. Va.
1949).
1 72 The sampling technique used in this survey was
only intended to reflect the opinions of Chicago at-
torneys, which Are not necessarily those of the national
legal community.
r AsmRicAN BAR Assoc., OPINIONS ON Porxs-
SIONAL ETmcs 3 (1967), Functions of Comm. on Pro-
fessional Ethics.
1. Formulate and recommend standards of ethics
and conduct in the practice of law as a profession;
consider the Canons of Ethics of the legal profession
and of judicial officers; and make recommendations
for amendments to or clarifications of the Canons of
Ethics when they may appear to be advisable.
2. Upon request, advise or assist state and local bar
associations in their activities in respect to the inter-
pretation of the Canons of Ethics; and furnish informa-
tion and make recommendations thereon to the House
of Delegates or the Board of Governors.
3. Be authorized, when consulted by any member of
the bar or by any officer or committee of a state or
local bar association, to express its opinion concerning
proper professional or judicial conduct, but these
opinions shall not deal with questions of judicial de-
cision or judicial discretion, and shall not be given
until submitted to the members"of the Committee and
approved by a majority thereof.
4. Be authorized to adopt such rules as it may deem
desirable concerning the methods and procedure to be
used in expressing opinions; such rules not to become
effective until approved by the Board of Governors.
The rules may be altered or abrogated by the House
of Delegates.
groups. The first contained fifty-eight lawyers who
were solo practitioners or members of firms con-
sisting of four or fewer partners, herein referred to
as "smaller firm" attorneys. The remaining sub-
group consisting of forty-three lawyers were
affiliated with firms of five or more attorneys,
herein referred to as "larger firm" attorneys.
All attorneys participating in the study were
presented with the following hypothetical situa-
tion:
Lawyer X's client has been indicted on. a
charge of armed 'robbery. He tells X that he
committed the act, but that he will only plead
guilty in return for a promise of a lenient sen-
tence. However, the case goes to trial since a
deal could not be made. During the course
of the trial, X lets his client take the witness
stand to deny his guilt.
They were then asked if they approved or disap-
proved of X's action. Attorneys in the Random
Sample were also asked whether they had ever
encountered such a situation. Those responding
affirmatively were requested to relate what they
had done. The others were asked what their re-
sponse would be in a similar situation.
FmiNGS
Attitudes in the Random Sample 4 were signifi-
cantly related to firm size. A plurality of smaller
firm lawyers approved of the situation while a
substantial majority of the larger firm attorneys
disapproved7 For smaller firm attorneys, loyalty
74 The results of the Random Sample segment of the
study disclosed 58% of the lawyers disapproved of the
situation, 35% approved, and 8% were undecided.
Percentages are rounded to the next highest whole
number.
The numerical results of the Random Sample part
of the study are as follows:
TABLE I
ATTITUDES OF THE RAmNor SAr.r- TOWARD A
LAWYER PUTTING A CRIMINAL.Y Accusxn CLIENT
ON THE WITNESS STAND TO CoMsr PERJURY
Part 1: By Firm Size
Responses (%) (%)





Note: Fifty-eight attorneys were classified as small
firm attorneys; Forty-three were from larger firms.
75 These results were supported by lawyers' replies
to another interview question: "What would you con-
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to the client may take precedence over loyalty to
the court; the responses of partners and associates
from the larger firms indicated a closer allegiance
to the court than to the client. This difference in
attitude may stem from the fact that attorneys
from larger firms generally practice more often
in the federal courts, where the environment
reinforces respect and loyalty for the court, while
attorneys from smaller firms are more likely to
practice before local courts which are less likely to
instill such sentiments.
76
Answers approving X's conduct in the hypo-
thetical were more prevalent among those attor-
neys who regularly engaged in litigation. 7 Lawyers
with considerable trial experience perhaps are more
sympathetic with the attorney confronted with
such a predicament because they are able to iden-
tify with the practical consequences of the alterna-
tive courses of conduct.
Interestingly, the members of the Ethics Group
were collectively unable to provide a definitive
response to the hypothetical. In contrast to the
Random Sample, the smaller firm members of the
Ethics Group tended to disapprove while their
counterparts from the larger firms were evenly
splitY9 The attitudes were more closely related,
however, to trial activity, with trial attorneys
approving more than non-litigators. 80 In addition,
the older members of the Ethics Group were more
sider to be the worst thing a lawyer can do?" 93% of
the small firm attorneys answered exploitation of the
client was the worst act a lawyer could undertake.
Only 76% of the large firm lawyers agreed with this.
In turn, 21% of the large firm attorneys felt the perpe-
tration of fraud was the most deprecable conduct,
while only 11% of the small firm representatives gave
that answer.
76CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETrIcs: A SURVEY Or nra
NEW YORK CITY BraR 84-95 (1966).
77
TABLE II
PERCENTAGE or LAWYERS IN RAN-Dom SAMPLE
WHO DISAPPROVED OF THE SITUATION BY AmOUNT
or TRIAL WORK, CONTROLLING FOR SIZE oF FiRm
Firm Size
Amount of Trial Work
Smaller Larger
Little or None 57 (28)* 91 (24)*
Some or Much 36 (25)* 81 (16)*
* Undecided cases excluded.
78 Forty-six per cent disapproved, forty-one per
cent approved, and thirteen per cent were undecided.7
9 Compare Table I supra note 74 and Table III
supra note 77.
80 Id.
likely to approve the presentation of the perjured
testimony in the context of the hypothetical than
the newer members who had served for less than
three years~m
The reasons offered for approval or disapproval
of X's conduct in the problem conform closely to
the arguments presented by Freedmann and
Chief Justice Burgern as support for their respec-
tive positions. Lawyers who disapproved thought
that the attorney was assisting in the perpetration
of perjury unless he pursued an approach in the
direct examination which he thought would avoid
the presentation of false testimony. They also
generally agreed that counsel should withdraw if
the perjurious conduct was unavoidable.
Those who approved felt that the lawyer should
use all available means to secure a favorable
judgment for his client, agreeing with Freed-
manN that it was the prosecution's burden to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Several
respondents remarked that the lawyer should not
be the judge of his client's guilt or innocence, and
they deplored the notion that the attorney should
withdraw when confronted with a client who in-
tends to offer perjurious testimony.
It would be misleading not to note the sizeable
proportion of responding lawyers who were unable
to determine their position on the hypothetical.85
The following response exemplifies the ambivalence
that some attorneys expressed.
You can tell him that he is perjuring himself.
In a sense you'd be an accessory to perjury. On
the other hand, a defendant is innocent until
proven guilty. It's almost a lawyer's duty to
withdraw from the case, but the court won't
let a lawyer withdraw. I'd want to get out of it.
The equivocation is understandable in terms of
the conflicting obligations that the legal system
has imposed on the practicing attorney8 6 In
addition, it is probably complicated by the fact
that only five per cent of the participants in the
study had ever confronted this ethical dilemma.P
In light of the fact that only nine per cent of the
81 Id.
8 See p. 1 supra.
8 See p. 2 supra.
84 Freedman, supra note 5, at 1471, 1477.
81 ih per cent of the Random Sample and 13% of
the Ethics- Group were undecided as to the question
of the ethical correctness of an attorney placing his
client on the stand, believing he will commit perjury.
86 See p. 3 supra.




respondents had ever been involved in criminal
cases3 the five per cent proportion becones rela-
tively important. It would appear to be a reason-
able inference that the issue under scrutiny con-
fronts many who engage in criminal defense work.
It is relevant, therefore, to focus on those attor-
neys who have actually experienced the dilemma
of a client informing them of an intent to commit
perjuryll
As with Freedman, these lawyers interpret the
legal system in a manner-that allows, and even
requires, that the client be allowed to testify per-
juriously if it will aid the defense.90 One chose,
however, to draw the line at that point:
There are three or four a year like this. Yes,
you draw a line. The client can lie but he can-
not expect me to get witnesses to support his
alibi. The jury knows that a man will do any-
thing to save himself. It's more important to
control the witnesses.
Regardless of the dictates of the legal profession,
these attorneys felt a moral duty to litigate each
case to the extent of allowing the client to perjure
himself if it would be tactically appropriate. 1 One
respondent stated:
I prefer to be a defendant's lawyer. People
don't do immoral things for nothing. They do
it because they have to. I don't care what peo-
ple do-I am tolerant. I never handled a crimi-
nal case where the client wasn't guilty. Every
judge should sit in jail for a day and see how
it is before they sentence a person.... [T]he
poor get it in the neck.
8 The incidence is not insignificant in this study.
However, the validity of the sampling technique is
subject to the survey's geographical limitations and
may, not reflect properly a national trend that the
perjury problem is prevalent.
8 While other participants in the study could only
theorize, analysis of the men who have encountered
the client who told them he would perjure himself
provides some concrete data to evaluate in a study
dealing with the reactions of the practicing bar. Again,
the size of the sample casts doubt on the applicability
of these answers on any wide basis.
90 See p. 1 supra.
91 Freedman allows the client to dictate whether he
will perjure himself.
Of course, before the client .testifies perjuriously,
the lawyer has a duty to attempt to dissuade him
on grounds of both law and morality. In addition,
the client should be impressed with the fact that his
untruthful alibi is tactically dangerous.... How-
ever,.., the final decision must necessarily be the
client's.
Freedman supra note 5, at 1478.
CONCLUSION
The private opinions of the attorneys questioned,
including those in the Ethics Group, clearly re-
flect the divergent viewpoints of the legal scholars
discussed earlier. 2 As the examination of the study
indicates, those closer to criminal defense work
were more likely to subscribe to the Freedman
view. The majority of those questioned, however,
would censure the conduct,93 . but even this is
inconclusive of the ethical problem.
It would be misleading to think that disapproval
of this situation merely stems from the interpreta-
tion of it as fraudulent, for, as Freedman points
out, attorneys in other areas of the law freely en-
gage in deceptive conduct.94 This view is sub-
stantiated in a study conducted by Carlin.9 5 He
observed that lawyers were still considered to be
within the bounds of ethical propriety by their
peers if they encouraged an elderly client to de-
velop evidence to show that a gift to children was
inter vivos rather than in contemplation of death,
even though the client had suffered a serious heart
attack recently. 8 The negative attitude toward
the defense attorney's ethical dilemma appears
to be influenced more by the fact that it is within
the confines of criminal law rather than by the
lofty concepts of ethics and morality.Y
Whether the defendant has a right to have the
jury determine the validity of his testimony with-
out intervention of the defense attorney, in the
last analysis, remains unanswered. This paper has
attempted to set forth the premises that underly
each position; hopefully this will assist the defense
1
2 See pp. 1-5 supra.
Ma See note 13 supra. The Committee on Admissions
and Grievances of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia stated, with the court's
approval, that if an attorney were to do in a court
what Freedman suggested in his paper, he would be
guilty of profressional misconduct. Washington Post,
May 15, 1966, at 1, col. 6.
91 Freedman, supra note 5, at 1473-74.
91CARIIN, LAwYERs' ETncs: A SuavEY or
NEW YoRX CITY BAR, (1966).
96 Id. at 46.
97 In another study, a similar expression of disdain
for criminal lawyers was evident. See Wood, Professional
Ethics Among Criminal Lawyers, 7 Soc. PRoB. 70
(1959). Even the greatest criminal advocates have
been criticized as being unethical and disreputable.
Wendell Phillips, the abolitionist, once referred to
Rufus Choate, a renowned Boston trial lawyer, as
"the man who made it safe to murder, and whose
health,. thieves asked before they began to steal."
FuEss, RUpus CHoATE: WizARD or =H LAW 141
(1928). Clarence Darrow had to hide from a bribery
charge brought against him when he represented a
labor leader, Tom Mooney, accused of murder.
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attorney in choosing which course to follow. In
addition, it serves notice that the Canons of
Ethics are probably inadequate in this circum-
stance and should be re-examined, considering the
possibility that one set of ethical guidelines for
crininal and civil attorneys may be impractical.
It is possible that the issue may be resolved in
the courts. The convicted defendant, wihose at-
torney has divulged to the trial judge a confession
of guilt and an intent to deny it on the witness.
stand, may be able to raise aviable Fifth and Sixth
amendment issue on appeal. 3 In light of the con-
flicting opinions of legal scholars and practitioners,.
perhaps this is the only manner in which a defini-
tive resolution of the dilemma will be reached.
Is See supra note 70.
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